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This article examines the science–policy interface in volcanic risk assessment. It analyses empirical data
from research on Montserrat, where new volcanic risk assessment methodologies were pioneered. We
discuss the ways in which these methods contributed towards the ordering of scientiﬁc advice in its
geographical context, and we provide examples of the complex and overlapping topologies that are
assembled in a volcanic eruption. In this case, the science–policy interface can be conceptualised as dif-
fusive: both science and policy contain multiple overlapping networks of actors, objects and ideas that
interact with one another through ﬂows of responsibilities, attribution, identity and interpretation. Vol-
canic risk management involves negotiation of conceptual, relational and physical boundaries, and as a
result requires the use of qualitative and quantitative methods across human and physical geography.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Disaster risk reduction research is increasingly seeking to be
holistic and to approach the planning for and mitigation of disas-
ters from top-down and bottom-up, but it is sometimes hindered
by relative disengagement with the science–policy interface. The
formula that risk is a combination of hazard and vulnerability
reﬂects a focus in disaster studies on the latter, and a focus on
the former in scientiﬁc research. However, the interface between
hazard and vulnerability is much less well studied, yet can play a
critical role as scientiﬁc hazard assessment may be used in govern-
ment decisions that seek to reduce vulnerability. Scientiﬁc advice
in disasters is increasingly recognised as an important area of
study. It will always been needed urgently in volcanic crises (per-
haps more so than for other hazards), and populations can become
dependent on science overnight when volcanic unrest begins and
there is a time-critical need for information about likely scenarios
(Donovan et al., 2013). Gaillard and Mercer (2013) further argue
that scientiﬁc knowledge must be integrated with local knowledge
in the risk assessment process, and Lane et al. (2011) have demon-
strated the impact that this can have on both the process of assess-
ment and its social reception – popular conceptions of risk may
differ signiﬁcantly from those of scientists. Such emerging
methods are important in managing the science–policy interface,
but raise epistemological questions about the nature, remit and,critically, limits of (social and physical) scientiﬁc knowledge when
it is used to inform policy.
An example of this arises in the use of scientiﬁc models in the
management of natural hazards through land zonation. While
scientiﬁc modelling has a great deal of value and power for under-
standing the possible trajectory of a hazard event and estimating
its likelihood, the use of models by experts and decision-makers
is also a social activity with potentially signiﬁcant social impacts,
and the ontological basis for the scientiﬁc modelling may not be
in accord with social perceptions of space and identity. Models
have a role in communication with populations, for example, but
as soon as they are used in this way their vulnerability as represen-
tations of nature is exposed. The use of scientiﬁc models in the
communication of risk and uncertainty has been discussed at
length in the literature on climate change (e.g. Wynne and
Shackley, 1994; Shackley and Wynne, 1995; Demeritt, 2001;
Demeritt et al., 2010, 2013; Hulme and Mahony, 2010; Hulme,
2009), and models are increasingly used to inform decision-making
regarding natural hazards (e.g. Demeritt et al., 2010, 2013;
Demeritt and Nobert, 2011; Kuhlicke and Demeritt, 2014; Nobert
et al., 2010). Models seek to bring a level of order to the natural
system in order to replicate its behaviour, but their application
to the social system via lines on hazard maps is complicated by
social, political and economic considerations relating to property
and business and by different ideas about space and identity
(Donovan et al., 2012a). In part, this relates to the different ways
that people conceptualise their spatial context (e.g. Haynes et al.,
2007). However, it also has wider ramiﬁcations in terms of national
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tity, particularly on small islands, may be closely entwined (e.g.
Skelton, 2000). This means that scientiﬁc advice about areas as safe
or unsafe can have wide-reaching consequences for geographical
imaginations.
In this paper, we reﬂect on the use of scientiﬁc models in volca-
nic risk assessment and management on the island of Montserrat, a
UK Overseas Territory in the West Indies, analysing the implica-
tions for science and policy on active volcanoes. Volcanic eruptions
on Montserrat occurred episodically between 1995 and 2010
(Druitt and Kokelaar, 2002; Wadge et al., 2014), requiring long-
term risk management, particularly in the demarcation of evacua-
tion zones. In this article, we initially examine the epistemological
basis of models and then contextualise these within the science
and policy literature on reﬂexivity and boundary work. Empirical
data from Montserrat is presented, concerning the scientiﬁc basis
for pyroclastic ﬂow models and their development, and scientists’
and locals’ views about modelling and about the broader political
context. The models were used alongside expert elicitation and
Monte Carlo simulation to produce risk assessments that fed into
the drawing of boundaries on maps (Wadge and Aspinall, 2014).
Finally, we draw out some broader themes from this discussion,
arguing that the philosophical, political and psychological factors
involved in the complex negotiation of risk assessments create
qualitative uncertainties that can be acknowledged through narra-
tives. This requires a reﬂexive, self-conscious and transparent
approach, and one that is geographically sensitive. At a very broad
level, it also presents an important opportunity for geographical
reﬂection on the nature of space–time-risk relations: volcanoes
and volcanic eruptions can be viewed as assemblages. They are
affected by and themselves affect the histories and geographies
of groups of people, objects and ideas who may be connected in
different, overlapping ways. They also provoke new associations
of ideas and actors – including models that gain a level of agency
in the decision-making process.Theoretical framework
In this section, we ﬁrst examine the different ways in which
models are conceptualised in the literature. We discuss scientiﬁc
use of models as means of representing and ordering the natural
system, and note the power of representation among scientists,
showing the impact of the social context on the ways in which
models are designed and used. We then focus on the implications
of this for studies of space: models seek to bring order to nature, to
enclose it within human frameworks. In contrast, human geogra-
phers have argued that space cannot be enclosed. Juxtaposing
these ideas provides some insight into the challenge of integrating
scientiﬁc assessments and policy decisions about land use. We
therefore move on to consider in more detail the literature on
boundary work and boundary objects in the context of science
and policy. We argue that geographical understandings of reﬂexiv-
ity and boundary work can elucidate the challenges faced by scien-
tists in risk assessment under uncertainty. Furthermore, the use of
models as a means of ordering the science–policy boundary
changes their nature: they become open to controversy in a way
that perhaps undermines the act of ordering itself. In the context
of hazard mapping, this is the result of the difﬁculty of bringing
order and enclosure to spaces that resist them.
We use the idea of diffusivity as a way to represent the
spreading out of ideas, objects and actors across these artiﬁcial
boundaries of science and policy. Another way to conceptualise
this might be to use the geographical theory around topology
and assemblages: volcanoes can be viewed as assemblages that
incorporate multiple impacts, interpretations, ideas, objects andpeople. These are different types of thing, but they relate to one
another in ways that are contingent (DeLanda, 2006). Relational
topologies exist within science and within policy, but also between
them – and power can diffuse through these relations. However, as
McFarlane (2009) notes, ‘‘refusing to use scalar concepts is a fruit-
less strategy given the prevalence of scalar narratives’’: similarly,
refusing to accept that there are felt conceptual boundaries – and
boundaries on maps – is impractical. However, the idea of diffusiv-
ity can be a link between these two conceptualisations, as the
forces of responsibility, knowledge, blame, ownership and identity
(among others) ‘‘spread out’’ through different types of
connections. This paper focuses tightly on the relationships
between scientiﬁc models and decision-making about land use,
and it demonstrates the complexity of negotiating volcanic risk
in its social context. In doing so, however, it also points to the
potential contribution of an integrated geographical approach to
volcanic risk management.
Models in environmental science
Models as sources of geographical narratives have been dis-
cussed by a number of authors (e.g. O’Sullivan, 2004): models
involve stories about potential futures, sometimes of particular
places. Recent studies of modelling practices within Geography
have elucidated their complexity and variety – and the draw of
new models that look impressive (e.g. Hulme and Mahony, 2010;
Mahony and Hulme, 2012; de Chadarevian and Hopwood, 2004;
Demeritt and Wainwright, 2009). Even prior to the recent debates,
Shackley and Wynne (1995, 1996) discussed the use of climate
models as ‘‘boundary-ordering devices’’, seeking to bring order to
the threat of chaos on the interface between uncertain science
and policy in trying to manage future risks.
Within science, models may simultaneously represent the best
science and be highly uncertain (e.g. Oreskes et al., 1994). They can
be conceptually very different, yet represent the same physical
processes. Giere (2004) notes that:
Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for var-
ious purposes. On this view, it is models that are the primary
(though by no means the only) representational tools in the sci-
ences.
[2004:747]In constructing his ‘‘cognitive theory of science’’, Giere (1988,
2004, 2006), Callebaut (2012) argues that scientiﬁc models are
dependent on the judgements and thought-processes of the scien-
tists who develop them. Models, in this view, are representations
of nature that carry with them some characteristics of their human
origin.
An interesting example of the representational power of models
concerns an outdated conceptual model that has proved persistent.
Kagan et al. (2012) note that in spite of extensive scientiﬁc evi-
dence a number of concepts persist in the seismological literature.
They focus on the ‘‘characteristic earthquake model’’, which posits
that faultlines have ‘‘characteristic earthquakes’’ that occur
periodically and represent the maximum likely magnitude for the
faultline. This has been challenged by extensive data analysis, yet
scientists ‘‘continue to use buzz phrases grounded in once-preva-
lent paradigms that have been subsequently refuted’’. They suggest
in conclusion that ‘‘the time for case studies, anecdotes,
speculation and Band-Aids for failed models has passed...otherwise
earthquake science will not deserve the name’’. This is an acknowl-
edgement (by scientists) of the power of representation within sci-
ence – and the assertion that it is unscientiﬁc. This follows from
recent debates about what constitutes ‘‘science’’ in hazard assess-
ment for Earth Sciences (e.g. Castanos and Lomnitz, 2002), and the
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tates further discussion of the philosophy of modelling and
method.
From this perspective, Oreskes et al. (1994) argued that the
veriﬁcation of models in the Earth Sciences is impossible;
O’Sullivan (2004) describes this claim as ‘‘irrefutable’’. In setting
out a ‘‘preliminary agenda’’ for science studies in geography,
Wainwright (2012) identiﬁes modelling as a critical issue because
of the complex dialogue between scientiﬁc practice and modelling
practice. He further notes the importance of particular places in the
making of science – an issue dealt with by historical geographers of
science (e.g. Livingstone, 2003, 2005; Powell, 2007, 2008; Withers
et al., 2006). Massey (1999) argues that in her conceptualisation,
‘‘‘space’ cannot be a closed system’’. The act of reclaiming models
for geographical purposes is thus one of ‘‘opening up’’, epistemo-
logically and spatially (Stirling, 2008). For Massey, space is
dynamic: it must be thought of in relation to time. It resists enclo-
sure in a model. In considering geographical models in light of this,
O’Sullivan (2004) suggests that ‘‘it is vital that modelling is not left
to the modellers’’ (291): the stories inherent in the models are
worthy of telling. This includes the provenance, assumptions and
limitations of the models, and the social implications of their use.
It follows from the above that (i) scientiﬁc practice is not purely
objective but encounters both social and political inﬂuences, par-
ticularly where it is envisaged as policy-relevant, (ii) scientiﬁc
models are heterogeneous, partial representations of reality, (iii)
a single model is only part of the picture and may require high lev-
els of judgement about not only input parameters but also about
context, conceptualisation and dimensions – about which scien-
tists may not agree and (iv) models are of great interest to human
geographers both in terms of the stories about nature and space
that they represent, and in terms of their social and political con-
texts. In the next section, we link these ideas with literature that
discusses the ways in which models and other ‘‘objects’’ may be
used by scientists and policymakers to negotiate boundaries.
Uncertainty, reﬂexivity and ‘‘boundary work’’
It is customary to separate ‘‘risk assessment’’ from ‘‘risk
management’’, ideally lining these up with ‘‘scientist’’ and ‘‘pol-
icy-maker’’ respectively and thereby retaining neutrality for scien-
tists. This is akin to the ‘‘linear model’’ for the science–policy
interface, which has been shown to be ﬂawed by numerous studies
(e.g. Owens, 2005; Fischer, 2000; Pielke, 2004): the interface
between science and policy is diffusive. Political factors affect the
ways in which scientiﬁc reports are framed, for example, just as
politicians’ interpretation of scientiﬁc information will affect the
decisions that are made (e.g. Jasanoff, 1990, 2004, 2005): scientiﬁc
reports and risk decisions are co-produced (Lövbrand, 2011;
Kuhlicke and Demeritt, 2014). Coproduction occurs through the
negotiation of uncertainty and authority in attempts to make evi-
dence-based decisions, and it occurs as scientists and policymakers
engage in boundary work.
The Science Studies literature refers to three different but over-
lapping concepts – ‘‘boundary work’’ (Gieryn, 1983), ‘‘boundary
objects’’ (Star and Griesemer, 1989) and ‘‘boundary-ordering
devices’’ (Shackley and Wynne, 1996). Gieryn (1983) used ‘‘bound-
ary work’’ to describe practices employed by scientists to delineate
their own disciplinary territory, and guard it against inﬁltration
from policy or social groups. It is ultimately a means of claiming
scientiﬁc authority and credibility. ‘‘Boundary objects’’ are those
that seek to enable communication across groups, such as between
scientists and the public, so that these groups can work together;
an example of a boundary object might be an alert level system,
such as the Hazard Level System on Montserrat (Donovan et al.,
2012a), which is discussed below. Shackley and Wynne (1996)refer to ‘‘boundary-ordering devices’’ as types of boundary object
that are short-lived or serve a particular purpose at a particular
time. The example they apply is that of representations of uncer-
tainty in climate change models, which negotiate between the
authority of science and its potential undermining by uncertainty.
Arguably, probabilistic risk assessments are boundary-ordering
devices, managing the grey zone between empirical science and
risk policy. On Montserrat, there have been two main methods that
might constitute this kind of work. Models have been used to
deﬁne lines on maps, and expert elicitation (e.g. Aspinall et al.,
2002; Cooke, 1991; Aspinall and Cooke, 1998) has been used to
provide probabilities (and uncertainties) of the events represented
by the lines (e.g. Aspinall et al., 2002; Wadge and Aspinall, 2014).
These maps and probabilities can then be applied in the political
management of the hazards. The problem with the application of
technologies like mapping to the management of hazards is that
they undermine any distinct boundary between science and policy,
because lines have to be drawn somewhere. While scientists may
argue that they are scientiﬁc because they follow the ﬂow runout
from models, populations may argue that the results depend on
the inputs, and directly affect their ability to get house insurance,
for example.
Science thus affects and is affected by its context. In examining
this, we turn to the social scientiﬁc idea of reﬂexivity. The concept
of reﬂexivity in the social sciences has been described by Lynch
(2000) as ‘‘used in a confusing variety of ways’’. In part, this stems
from the same duality of meaning as noted by Beck (1999):
reﬂexive practice in research involves a self-consciousness, while
reﬂexive actions may also be unconscious. Thus Bourdieu (2004)
refers to reﬂexivity as a ‘‘mirror effect’’ (2001:4). Lynch (2000) sug-
gests that some practitioners apply reﬂexivity as a means of
‘‘increasing objectivity’’ in their research. He goes on to produce
an inventory of reﬂexivities, demonstrating the many uses of the
term and the potential inadequacy of self-consciously reﬂexive
research. In this article, we take reﬂexivity to mean a self-aware
analysis of the role of the practitioner in the results of the research.
As such, it is also a means of managing social uncertainties.
Brown (2010) has argued for a more open treatment of uncer-
tainty in environmental research, noting the presence of social,
psychological and geographical uncertainties (see also Stirling,
2007, 2008; Wynne, 1992; Jasanoff, 2004, 2005, 2007; Pidgeon
and Fischoff, 2011; Richards et al., 1997; Power, 2007). Under-
standing the complex ways in which uncertainty is generated is
critical in appreciating the social and political implications of sci-
entiﬁc work. In this article, we examine the rapid development
of scientiﬁc models alongside an evolving political situation in a
particular place. We suggest that not only do both qualitative and
quantitative expressions of uncertainty play a key role, but also
that a reﬂexive, contextualised approach to risk assessment
requires that scientiﬁc models and data be used in a distinctive
way and with a deep consciousness of psychological, political
and philosophical inﬂuences on method and interpretation. The
liminal nature of risk assessment – not only between scientists
and policymakers, but often on the edge of scientiﬁc philosophical
boundaries – necessitates a broader discussion of meaning and
uncertainty in understanding the co-production of science and
social order (Jasanoff, 2004).
Boundaries – spatial or conceptual – are vulnerable things.
Human geographers have argued that space cannot be bounded,
and that geography itself is fundamentally uncontainable – it is
constructed of networks and ﬂows that are not readily pinned
down (Amin, 2004, 2007). Space is relational, not scalar. The rela-
tional turn in geographical thinking (e.g. review in Jones (2009))
presents an important opportunity for the geographies of science
and Science Studies. The use of models as a form of representation,
communication and of social adjustment is fundamentally
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scientiﬁc networks are all linked through their collective role in
managing an eruption. Furthermore, the level of inﬂuence that
each has on the process can be regarded as a diffusion of power
and ideas. For example, while a report is written by scientists,
using scientiﬁc language and based on scientiﬁc data, it is read
by policymakers and the public with their own cultural and expe-
riential background. It is not retained within a bounded entity that
can be called ‘‘science’’ because it has a social origin and a social
role, and it generates ideas and impacts that percolate into policy
and populations.
This paper therefore draws on the Science Studies literature in a
particular geographical context, and in doing so it argues that a
geographical gaze can exert considerable power in understanding
not just the nature of ‘‘boundary work’’, but also its problems:
boundaries are contingent and socially constructed. They are
inevitably transgressed through the interconnected ideas, objects
and actors that refuse to remain in one camp or another. Scientiﬁc
networks grasp ideas and concerns that are political, social or eco-
nomic, while policymakers learn to ‘‘decode’’ scientiﬁc information
and make judgements about its validity themselves. Boundaries,
like models, are representations that are open to interpretation
and interrogation. Geographical approaches can thus bring consid-
erable insight into the complex topologies of representation in the
management of risk on active volcanoes.
Local context and methods
Following the Emergency Powers Act of 1996, the Governor of
Montserrat had the power to order mandatory evacuations, in con-
sultation with the local government (through a committee latterly
known as the National Disaster Preparedness and Response Advi-
sory Committee, or NDPRAC), and based generally on scientiﬁc
advice. In order to facilitate such advice, the Montserrat Volcano
Observatory (MVO) was established in 1995 (Aspinall et al.,
2002; Donovan et al., 2013). In addition, senior academic scientists
were involved in providing advice to the Governor’s Ofﬁce – in
2003, this group was formalised as a Scientiﬁc Advisory Committee
(SAC). Prior to 2003, it was known as the Risk Assessment Panel
(RAP). Many of the scientists involved with the SAC also carry
out extensive research on Montserrat. During the period covered
in this article, the SAC was meeting every six months. The MVO
and the SAC together included Caribbean scientists, European sci-
entists and US scientists with varying levels of experience and
involves geochemists, geophysicists and geologists. There has been
no ofﬁcial involvement of social scientists in the risk assessments
on Montserrat.
A series of articles in Nature in 1998 gave a high proﬁle to the
challenges faced on Montserrat by scientists, and the extent of
public trust (e.g. Masood, 1998; Aspinall et al., 1998; Voight,
1998). In particular, the need to communicate ‘‘uncertainty and
doubt’’ was expressed, amidst accusations that the locals’ predic-
tions were on a par with the scientists’. This continued to be a
theme: throughout the evacuation from October 2002 to July
2003, for example, the Montserrat Reporter carried articles, letters
and limericks about the inadequacy of the science, and a case
was brought against the Governor by a group of local residents
(Aspinall and Sparks, 2004; Donovan et al., 2012a). Even where
these represented an extreme minority view, they were
nevertheless symptomatic of tensions and suspicions that pres-
sured scientists. (For detailed discussions of changing identities
on the island, see Skelton, 2000, 2003.) This politicising of volca-
nology can be challenging for both sides. On Montserrat, it has
been complicated by the difﬁcult transition from an acute crisis
mentality in government and society to the appreciation that the
eruptions may continue for decades and should be regarded as a‘‘chronic’’ problem for planning purposes (Donovan and
Oppenheimer, 2014). Managing this transition has required
consistent yet innovative approaches to scientiﬁc modelling and
to scientiﬁc reporting (Aspinall et al., 2002; Loughlin et al., 2010;
Wadge, 2009; Donovan et al., 2012b,c,d). The negotiation of bound-
aries took place between the roles of the local government and the
UK government (on Montserrat and in Whitehall), between scien-
tists and policymakers, between physical science and probabilistic
approaches to risk assessment and between the MVO and the SAC.
Below, we use an example of rapid evolution of physical models
that were used in probabilistic risk assessment to analyse the nat-
ure of these boundaries and the ways in which they were negoti-
ated – particularly those between science and policy.
This article draws on interviews of local residents, scientists and
government ofﬁcials in Montserrat and the UK, and participant
observation carried out at the Montserrat Volcano Observatory
between 2008 and 2009 in two ten-week ﬁeld seasons, including
attendance at two meetings of the Foreign and Commonwealth
Ofﬁce Scientiﬁc Advisory Committee on Montserrat Volcanic
Activity. In total, 62 semi-structured interviews with government
ofﬁcials (10), scientists (21) and residents (31) were carried out.
Questions were open to allow interviewees to share their experi-
ences freely. Participants were selected according to their role or
through contacts in local businesses (by snowballing in order to
gain a varied sample of stakeholders, some of whom were
‘‘remote’’ from the usual; e.g. Atkinson and Flint, 2001). This
included key decision-makers in the Montserratian government
and representatives of the UK government on the island. In addi-
tion, extensive documentary research was undertaken at the Mont-
serrat Volcano Observatory. All the qualitative data were coded by
themes that arose from the dataset itself. The large volume and
diversity of data gathered and analysed in this project required
that codes be relatively simple and broad (e.g. Somekh and
Lewin, 2005). Quotations in the text are from the interviews unless
otherwise stated. An indication of the role of participants is given,
but owing to the small number of people involved, a detailed
account would breach conﬁdentiality. In this paper, we focus on
the perceptions that scientists had of local people’s views. Quota-
tions are selected because they are representative of themes within
the dataset as a whole.
The 8th January 2007 event on Montserrat
This section discusses an example from Montserrat concerning
the application of scientiﬁc models at a time when modelling
capacity was developing rapidly and in dialogue with an evolving
risk management issue. It seeks to demonstrate empirically the
argument of the theoretical discussion above: that risk assessment
is a social process as well as a scientiﬁc one, and that its diverse
epistemologies require contextualisation of both qualitative and
quantitative uncertainties through reﬂexive narratives that allow
for the multifaceted, connective nature of risk. This process
acknowledges that scientiﬁc assessment cannot truly be indepen-
dent of its political implications, and there is a level of diffusion
between science and political decision-making, through the
involvement of human actors, impacts and ideas throughout the
process.
An example of the links between physical danger, scientiﬁc risk
assessment, the delineation of boundaries and national identity
was provided by one long-term resident:
...the people who have come, I don’t believe have any desire to go to
Plymouth. They don’t have any desire to go south of Belham,
because everything is north – they work in the north, they live in
the north, Brades – the government headquarters – is in the north
... they haven’t lost what most of us have...
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sis of the science–policy interface that follows: it shows that spa-
tial restrictions, imposed by the volcano via scientiﬁc advice and
political decision-making, had lasting impacts on the way that
people thought about Montserrat’s identity. The population is
essentially divided between those who remember Montserrat
pre-1995, and those who do not – with the latter continually
increasing in number. Lines on maps affect the ways in which peo-
ple think about places. This demonstrates the importance of under-
standing the generation of such lines and the complex, intertwined
topologies with which they interact. This paper now examines one
aspect of this problem – the relationship between scientiﬁc models
and public policy.
Models in volcanology
Interviews with scientists conﬁrm that modelling results are
known within the scientiﬁc community to be interpretations and
not facts. There is a degree of subjectivity involved – a choice of
the best-ﬁt model does not equate to the actual system; it approx-
imates it. Judgement calls in modelling are also made concerning
the use of discrete and continuous variables, and dimensionality
– indeed, even in risk maps it has been argued that gradation
should be continuous rather than discrete, an issue raised by inter-
viewees (see also Haynes et al., 2007). Increasing complexity may
increase accuracy at the same time as increasing uncertainty. Test-
ing of a model using actual events provides some measure of the
reliability of the model, but is dependent on the availability of data
(Spiegelhalter and Riesch, 2011; see also Oreskes et al., 1994). The
use of diverse input parameters is further complicated by
divergent interpretations of events that have been observed. The
eruption of 8th January, 2007, for example, may or may not have
had a small explosive component, and may or may not have orig-
inated in the dome itself.1 This demonstrates the importance of
combining information from multiple sources in risk assessment:
It goes back to philosophy of science. . . for hazard purposes . . . the
attitude should be that all interpretations of the data are valid
unless you can demonstrate they’re not. . . the multiple-working-
hypothesis syndrome is extremely important in hazards because
even if you think that one interpretation is the best one, you should
actually include all of the other alternative interpretations because
they might have hazard or risk implications.
[Senior scientist, SAC]2 In detail, the models allowed the simulation of potential hazard events, and the
potential temporal frequency of the hazards was assessed using expert elicitation. The
boundary lines on the maps allow the deﬁnition of zones, for which individual risk
per annum could be calculated based on assumptions of the population of the zones,This represents a desire to manage the uncertainty involved in
hazard assessment by maximising the volume of information avail-
able, and including all non-falsiﬁed interpretations. It also shows
the inherent uncertainty in the decisions about which models to
use, and suggests a difference between science ‘‘for hazard pur-
poses’’ and research: the context affects the ways in which science
is applied.
Volcanologists have devised a range of methods for modelling
pyroclastic ﬂows (e.g. Wadge et al., 1998; Widiwijayanti et al.,
2004, 2009; Esposti Ongaro et al., 2007, 2008). Some of these mod-
els are based on ‘‘semi-empirical’’ databases of past ﬂows, while
others are purely dynamical, based on simpliﬁed representations
of ﬂow over topography. In the following section, we give an exam-
ple of a speciﬁc case in which models of pyroclastic ﬂow run-out
informed the quantitative risk assessment process. In response to
the dome collapse and generation of pyroclastic ﬂows towards
inhabited areas on 8th January 2007, a major initiative to estimate
future hazards was undertaken, alongside a well-established1 This event was discussed with interviewees and during ﬁeldwork, and different
views were expressed.elicitation method for assessing likely frequency, and the number
of models used increased – this diversity is part of the process of
including all of ‘‘the other alternative interpretations’’. Probabilistic
hazard models were combined with assessments of frequency and
population to estimate risk. The following section thus outlines the
dialogue between emerging science and emerging social order. It
also shows the complexity of scientiﬁc modelling in the context
of social anxiety and the history of scientiﬁc and socio-political
interactions.
The procedural development of scientiﬁc models
During the second half of 2006, the lava dome began to grow
rapidly. By December 2006 the dome facing the northwest side
of the volcano threatened the Belham Valley and the inhabited
areas around it (Fig. 1). On 8th January, 2007, a dome collapse sent
pyroclastic ﬂows down the Belham Valley as far as Cork Hill
(Loughlin et al., 2010). With a large dome that remained and posed
a continuing threat on the northwest side, the question of a ‘‘safe’’
line was raised, along with more detailed zonation in the Old
Towne-Olveston area. Over a few weeks members of the SAC and
colleagues deployed an unprecedented combination (see below)
of four pyroclastic ﬂow simulation codes that were used to assess
the hazards posed by dome collapse and lateral blast ﬂows in the
Belham Valley (Table 1). The 8th January event was used to cali-
brate the models, but the volume of the dome capable of collapse
into the Belham Valley was not accurately known. These models
were used to provide hazard lines for the maps (Wadge, 2009;
Esposti Ongaro et al., 2008) – challenging because of the high
uncertainty in the models, but the authorities ‘‘want to know
where the line is on the ground’’ and ‘‘the delineation of the bound-
aries would be set based on these models’’ (senior scientist).2
Certainly when the Chief Scientist or director or whoever goes to
talk to them after the SAC meeting, the discussions are usually at
a fairly basic level, as in, do we have to leave or don’t we? ... Is
the Belham safe or isn’t it... the scientists of course try to draw lines,
and they draw fuzzy lines or they draw sharp lines and they draw
lines of uncertainty...
[Senior scientist MVO]
This challenge was also expressed by local ofﬁcials seeking to
create evidence-based policy: the boundaries are based on the
models but are ofﬁcially set by the NDPRAC. This quotation also
raises the issue of the conjunction of binary decisions and the more
complex probabilistic representation of hazard (Demeritt et al.,
2010). These uncertainties complicate public decision-making
because they do not sit easily with the realities faced by deci-
sion-makers. They also allow a blurring around the process of
boundary-negotiation, so that science is buffered from the
political.
The continuing requirement that uncertain models be accorded
social relevance was a driving factor in the reﬁnement of models
during the course of the eruption: policymakers wanted to use
the models to set – and justify – the boundaries, while scientists
were aware of the uncertainty involved in doing so.3 For example,
SAC 7 (SAC, 2006b) revised the PYROFLOW models in accordance
with historical ﬂow directionality (Fig. 2) as the control on how
much material travelled in each direction (this had previously beenusing the elicitation probabilities and Monte Carlo population impact risk simulation
modelling.
3 This is evidenced in the SAC reports, which continuously develop and reﬁne the
models and input data that are used.
Fig. 1. Map of Montserrat, derived from an ASTER image, 2006. Contours (50 m) are derived from an SRTM digital elevation model. The Belham Valley is shown in blue, and
the summit of the active volcano is shown as a red triangle. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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tively limited by calibration to the set of ﬂows with runouts less than
about 6 km (maximum onshore runout to date), whilst longer, larger
ﬂows were not represented. It was these longer ﬂows capable of
reaching 8 km or more down the Belham Valley that were simulatedin early 2007, in accordance with scientiﬁc judgement that they
were important. The rapid evolution of volcanic activity on the
north-west side of the volcano in early 2007 also prompted the pro-
duction of new models for lateral blasts in particular. In February
2007, the MVO asked the SAC for an interim assessment of risk, as
Table 1
Models used on Montserrat during SAC 8.
Model Physical basis
PYROFLOW (Wadge et al., 1998; Wadge, 2009) Dynamical – gravity ﬂow + surge component Monte-Carlo ensemble approach can be applied, using observed data
from Montserrat to estimate likely future ﬂows (Wadge, 2009)
PFz (Schilling, 1998; Iverson et al., 1998;
Widiwijayanti et al., 2009)
Statistical – calculates how a valley will be ﬁlled with a particular volume using semi-empirical equations (e.g.
Widiwijayanti et al., 2009)
TITAN-2D (Patra et al., 2005; Widiwijayanti
et al., 2004)
Dynamical – simulates a granular ﬂow, provides a timeseries of material location areally. Numerical computational
simulation using a DEM
PDAC (Esposti Ongaro et al., 2007, 2008) Dynamical – 3D multiphase ﬂow model; can simulate ﬂows with a blast component
Fig. 2. SAC 7, Fig. 4. Probability of pyroclastic ﬂow inundation using PYROFLOW. The ensemble of simulations shows how often any given spot is inundated in 66 (or 56, right)
years of simulated activity of dome collapse ﬂows with runouts less than 6 km. Left result is with directional weighting calculated; right result is from SAC 6 (SAC, 2006a) with
directional weighting estimated. The white arrow is approximately 2 km long (no scale on original).
Fig. 3A. Map for February 2007 Interim Assessment. Zones A and B were those provided with probabilistic assessments. The solid black line divides A and B, which are
bounded by thick dashed lines. The thin dashed lines are the surge margins of potential dome collapse ﬂows with volumes of 12 and 20 million cubic metres. The black arrow
is approximately 1 km (no scale on the original).
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the zones used for the calculation of individual risk scores. The text
of the Interim Report (SAC, 2007a) notes that:
These values very much depend on where the line between areas A
and B is drawn. If, for example, the A/B line had followed the 12
million surge line then the individual risk exposure within the
smaller area A would have increased.
[italics in original, p2]
This shows that the uncertainty in the location of the lines was
an area of concern, because it affected the social data used in the
calculation of individual risk per annum: having run the model,
the scientists still had to make a decision about where to put the
lines for the rest of the assessment – literal ‘‘boundary work’’,
and also work that involves uncertain judgement. The report notes
in its conclusion that ‘‘the current evacuation zone boundary based
on the SAC7 report 12 million cubic metre surge modelling has no
‘margin of safety’ and hence may not be sufﬁciently cautious’’ (p3)
– a social comment, acknowledging the need for precaution to pro-
tect people and perhaps showing the scientists’ own perceptions of
the risk as higher than it was perceived by the population. This is
based on a scientiﬁc assessment of the risk, but also an awarenessFig. 3B. Map for March 2007 Interim Assessment, this time using three population zones
collapse (‘‘normal’’) and lateral blast surge limit runouts by volume as stated (20 M – 20
zones were also used in SAC 8. The black arrows are approximately 1 km (no scale on th
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)of the use to which that assessment will be put – demonstrating
the diffusivity inherent in the use of scientiﬁc information for risk
management. Interestingly, a UK ofﬁcial stated:
The point about the SAC is that it is uninformed by the human
geography – it’s purely the physical geography. They work out
the hard numbers for particular areas if they’re asked... they’re very
good at taking long-term views ... that type of area where a director
on a day to day basis might be quite nervous about that... [we get] a
different sense of perspective out of the SAC.
This suggests a view that science is completely separate from
the human – and that ‘‘hard numbers’’ for risk exist. Yet at the
same time, it also acknowledges the effect of the nature of the
request for advice on different groups of scientists with different
perspectives. Again, this quotation is indicative of the diffusive nat-
ure of the science–policy interface: it shows that people try to sep-
arate science from the human, and yet are simultaneously aware of
its human aspects.
The March 2007 Interim Assessment (SAC, 2007b), and SAC 8
(SAC, 2007c) (late March 2007) saw the incorporation of new mod-
els for dome collapse ﬂows and – for the ﬁrst time – for lateral
blasts. This led to the redrawing of the zone boundaries (Fig. 3B).(1–3, bounded by black thin and thick dashed lines). Coloured lines represent dome
million cubic metres. Lateral blast scenarios also give arrival times in seconds. These
e original). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the
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FLOW model), SAC 8 used a suite of four different models for pyro-
clastic ﬂows and lateral blasts – ‘‘a pioneering effort’’ (SAC 8
Technical Report, p 5) during a volcanic crisis (Table 1). All of the
models were calibrated using real data from Montserrat. In partic-
ular, the PDAC model of a north-directed lateral blast was cali-
brated using the model parameters for the Boxing Day 1996 blast
to the southeast (Esposti Ongaro et al., 2008). This also required
that the digital elevation model be kept up to date as the eruption
reshaped the topography of the island (a GPS-based survey was
carried out on 9th February 2007).
In this case, the newmodels suggested a signiﬁcantly higher risk
to the population in the event of a lateral blast to the northwest,
compared to the equivalent ‘‘normal’’ dome collapse ﬂow; see the
equivalent 20 million cubic metre event lines (solid red = blast,
dashed black = dome collapse) in Fig. 3B. The increase in calculated
risk was a result of the use of the new, more advanced models
rather than of the volcanic activity itself, but was felt by the scien-
tists to be a real increase in risk as a result of lower epistemic uncer-
tainty and its impact on the result of the risk assessment. The
February interim analysis prompted the evacuation of Area 1 by
the NDPRAC (Fig. 3B). The progression of science was directly wired
into the change in policy, but the language of the reports seeks to
manage the uncertainty inherent within the lines by suggesting
options to the authorities – the conclusion of the February report
repeats concerns about lines not being ‘‘sufﬁciently cautious’’ for
example, and authorities ‘‘may wish to consider’’ the lines again.
Political challenges and uncertainties
This development of models was itself negotiating between the
volcanic activity and the risk that it posed to the population: there
was public criticism in local media of the MVO because it was felt
by some that the evacuation was unnecessary. Furthermore, the
reasoning for the boundaries was not always appreciated by the
population:
The evacuation lines are so arbitrary. My house could be in the safe
zone and that house over there not. I mean literally there are
houses next to each other and one had to go and the other could
stay, so that creates frustration.
[Resident, referring to evacuations prior to 2009]
It is interesting to note that this quotation describes the bound-
aries as ‘‘evacuation lines’’: a reference to their felt effect rather
than their empirical origins. The resulting popular frustration
tended to affect MVO scientists more than SAC members, although
the SAC were very much aware of the problem in interviews. A
similar situation had occurred in 2002–3, noted above, and was
also characterised by a large dome in the NW. The SAC interim
report in February 2007 noted,
The level of quantitative analysis that has gone into the current
deliberations is greater than 2003.
[p3]
This demonstrates an awareness of the similarity to the 2003
events, which had caused considerable upheaval – and explicitly
seeks to gain authority and objectivity from ‘‘quantitative analysis’’
(a form of boundary work). Rhetoric in the reports includes refer-
ences to ‘‘more sophisticated computer models’’ and being ‘‘at
the cutting edge of what is currently technically possible’’: volcanic
risk assessment with direct social consequences was occurring
alongside scientiﬁc advancement. In recognition of this, the SAC
produced a separate document with the March Interim Report. It
notes that ‘‘all lines on maps marking their (PF) extent should
really be thought of as being for very broad guidance’’ – indicativeof scientists’ discomfort with the use of the lines administratively
and a recognition of their liminal status. It goes on to suggest ways
in which the government could mitigate the effects of ﬂows and
blasts to the north-west, including risk education using videos of
models, alterations to houses and the use of sirens. The basis for
this advice is the experience with the models and previous actual
events on Montserrat in 1997. It seems to attempt to bring order
to the application of the scientiﬁc advice by the authorities, and
the reaction of the public. Expertise and experience are strongly
emphasised, and there are also strong denials of liability (as there
are in all SAC reports). A response to the uncertainty about both the
science and the public response was to appeal to the authority of
science and also to increase the level of social and political
comment within the reports. This simultaneously enforced the
boundary around the remit of the science, but also indicated the
penetration of social concerns through that boundary: the scien-
tists experienced qualitative uncertainties about the likely
response of the government to their advice.
There is abundant evidence of the political challenges of risk
assessment and management on Montserrat, and the complex
boundaries and connectivities involved (Aspinall et al., 2002;
Haynes et al., 2007, 2008; Donovan and Oppenheimer, 2014;
Pattullo, 2000). Both scientists and ofﬁcials tended to link the
British Government with risk aversion, and the local government
with a desire to ‘‘keep the island going’’:
The British Government on the whole has been more risk averse
than the local population and their political representatives. That’s
verged on denial at times, particularly early on in the crisis by the
local politicians ... basically there was a denial syndrome that some-
thing this terrible was happening – and certainly the Government of
Montserrat and its chief ministers and politicians have tended to be
less risk averse because they want to keep the island going.
[Senior scientist SAC]
Some interviewees expressed the reasoning they thought was
behind the differences:
They want to be seen to have their independence. The British Gov-
ernment doesn’t want dead people, ultimately, on their hands, that
they can be... so they’ve tended to be more risk averse in their per-
spective...the difference has occasionally been quite marked.
[Senior scientist SAC]
The UK and Montserrat governments were thus perceived as
having very distinctive risk tolerance thresholds (varying with
time), and this was linked to physical proximity and local concern.
Other interviewees noted the importance of individual interests in
a small community:
It’s a very small community so you have links all over the place,
and somebody with family and property and mining interests, eco-
nomic interests then in the position of chief minister can leave you
in a very difﬁcult position.
[Senior scientist MVO]
The implication of this is that the scientist was aware of eco-
nomic factors that might affect decision-making in the NDPRAC.
This is similar to the reference to ‘‘independence’’ in the previous
quotation: there is an implication that social and economic factors
affect the level of risk tolerated by members of the governments.
If they react too soon they’ll be accused of causing economic ruin...
you’re taking away people’s homes and means of sustaining them-
selves. You take the homes of the few wealthy down there, then you
take away the jobs of the gardeners and the cleaners and in a small
economy you’re starting to cause ripples. It’s the big lives versus
livelihoods issue that you’ve always got with a volcano.
[Senior scientist MVO]
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dynamics that were affected by the land-use decisions, and the
potential for accusations to be made against the NDPRAC for
overreacting. This reality was closely linked to frustration about
attitudes towards the volcano observatory during evacuations:
Now, when you actually have to tell the authorities that you think
this place is not safe, that the authorities will actually evacuate
people ... and can hide behind the MVO regarding the actual deci-
sion, ...if we evacuate you it’s not for the sake of it, it’s literally that
you’re actually in danger... I can’t think of any evacuations which
were not fully justiﬁed, here, and but they have this kind of senti-
ment that the MVO’s behind all this.
[Senior scientist MVO]
The tendency for scientists to be blamed for unpopular deci-
sions demonstrated the pressure that was felt in the assessment
process.
What almost always happened is that people didn’t know who to
blame – anything to do with the volcano, they would then tend
to blame MVO... I think this is a well known strategy in Montserrat.
I think that a lot of the government people and the chief minister –
all sorts of people do it ... But it’s something that I think we’re all
familiar with and used to dealing with. I think that’s almost busi-
ness as usual.
[Senior scientist MVO]
An undercurrent in these quotations is the disjunction
between a ‘‘low’’ risk in probabilistic terms, and the felt ‘‘reality’’
of the risk. This uncertainty was identiﬁed as a source of the
frustrating encounters with the small population that resisted
evacuation. Scientists and ofﬁcials maintained that the evacua-
tions had always been necessary. Local people in general agreed,
but some felt that since the houses in question had not been
destroyed, the evacuations were ‘‘false’’: there is a distinction
between local and scientiﬁc understanding of decision-making
under uncertainty.
There was also some distinction between SAC scientists and
MVO scientists in this context – MVO scientists were much more
conscious of the direct impacts of decisions on attitudes to the
observatory. They were living on the island and therefore had
to interact with members of the public on a daily basis (compare
Rothstein et al., 2006). There was a recognised need to try to
delineate the scientiﬁc work and keep it separate from the deci-
sion, but also an awareness that the two are closely linked in
the perception of everyone else: even if the process of risk assess-
ment is distinct from the decision-making, there is clearly dia-
logue between them through human language and interaction.
The period covered in this paper – January to April 2007 – was
also characterised by a much greater involvement of the SAC than
was standard in the longer term. In general, SAC assessments
were six-monthly. There was a confessed blurring of the roles
between the MVO and the SAC at this point, partly because the
SAC had the modelling expertise, partly because of legal issues
and partly because political pressure was high. Boundary work
was ongoing both between science and policy, and within the
science.4 This was suggested by non-scientist interviewees.
5 There were no obvious patterns in the demographic of those who expressed
scepticism.Models and experts
An important question in the context of scientiﬁc advice is the
cognitive inﬂuence of models on experts, particularly if the models
represent more than the ‘‘standard way of doing things’’. The sig-
niﬁcance of the models may be exaggerated, for example, by those
close to them and involved in their development (e.g. Shackley andWynne, 1996) – or such an exaggeration may be perceived by the
public.4 Yet withholding new scientiﬁc results from a risk assess-
ment or a published risk map could easily be interpreted as negligent
should a foreseen event occur. The disclosure of information is
clearly an imperative for good scientiﬁc risk governance; the chal-
lenge is ensuring that the models are understood more widely as
models and not as watertight predictions. An example was provided
by a senior scientist (SAC):
Is it capable of a big Plinian eruption that would threaten the
north? We think No. The last time we looked at it was about 18
months ago . . . there’s no real new information since then. The only
information there is going to be will either be new stratigraphy/
petrology information that comes along, or it could be some new
whizzo model that predicts giant Plinians 15 years after the start
of a new system like this, which seems unlikely.
This question pervades risk assessments throughout the erup-
tion, particularly early on when there was high uncertainty about
the potential for large magnitude eruptions – once knowledge
became available, the risk to the north decreased. The communica-
tion of risk as it is increased or decreased by scientiﬁc knowledge
expansion raises questions about the nature of risk and uncer-
tainty. An increase in knowledge can legitimately increase the risk,
while reducing the (epistemic) uncertainty. Interpretation of the
results requires judgement, as does any probabilistic assessment
based on them: the models demonstrated what might happen if
a particular volume of rock was involved in a blast, but not the
likelihood of it happening (or the likelihood of the model being
accurate). This was assessed using elicitation and Monte Carlo pop-
ulation impact modelling (Wadge and Aspinall, 2014).
The use of models and elicitation – with high uncertainties – as
socially authoritative guidelines was not universally accepted,
either by the public or by the scientists, though many appreciated
that it was necessary.5 Unfortunately, adding uncertainties to the
models in order to embody precaution in the process made the lines
more conservative and therefore less likely to be well received by the
public: the uncertainty bounds on either side of a best-ﬁt model line
may be applied to ofﬁcial zonation by selecting the line furthest from
the source of the hazard. This is a subjective administrative decision,
but one that appeals under high uncertainty. Trying to communicate
the idea of model uncertainty proved very difﬁcult – not least
because the nature of scientiﬁc models in general may be poorly
understood by non-scientists.
I remember back to one SAC report when somebody said, ‘‘Oh,
there’s a danger of a lateral blast and it’s going to be so many per-
cent probability that it would happen’’, and it was a very high
probability, and to this day it’s never happened, so people would
question that and ask why. And they’d say, ‘‘Oh, we modelled it’’,
and some people said, ‘‘well you only get out of your computer
what you put in’’, so you know I think perhaps there’s room for
people to discuss that. . . What else has been modelled in the world?
What modelling has been shown to be successful? Things like that.
[Local ofﬁcial]
The perception by some residents that the scientists were
somehow deliberately seeking to produce models that indicated
high risks is revealing. It suggests that the scientists’ awareness
of some hostility locally was accurate, and that some local people
were not clearly able to separate scientiﬁc modelling from political
decisionmaking with political motives. Other interviewees varied
in their responses to seeing the models at a public meeting. Some
were sceptical, as the quotation above shows, while others were
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the risk more fully. There were no signiﬁcant demographic
indicators of their views. However, from the point of view of the
authorities, accrediting the decisions to ‘‘scientiﬁc models’’ was
very appealing – and this is comparable to recent discussions con-
cerning social authority (as opposed to epistemic authority) of cli-
mate models (Hulme and Mahony, 2010; see also Shackley et al.,
1998; Shackley and Wynne, 1996; Demeritt et al., 2010). Ulti-
mately, the management and measuring of risk as science evolves
and new tools become available requires a complex set of social
and scientiﬁc judgements by those carrying out the risk assess-
ment. Thus, while models can bring some order to the boundary
between scientiﬁc advice and policy making, they also raise chal-
lenges on both sides.
In April 2007, the dome stopped growing. A further interim
assessment was carried out in July 2007, and people were allowed
to return to their homes in the Lower Belham Valley. Donovan et al.
(2012a) described the hazard level system that was developed on
Montserrat in 2008. Prior to 2008, several different zonation and
alert level systems had been used, including a microzonation sys-
tem in 1997 and a series of risk maps from 1997 to 2006
(Aspinall et al., 2002; Haynes et al., 2007). In February 2006, an
alert level system was devised by the MVO, and the government
assigned particular civil actions to each level of the system. In
October 2007, the SAC noted in their report that these actions were
insufﬁciently ﬂexible given the nature of volcanic activity. Follow-
ing this, the newMVOmanagement instituted a new ‘‘Hazard Level
System’’ in August 2008, which combined scientiﬁc modelling as
discussed in this article with a level of ﬂexibility in the actions
required by each hazard level (from 1 to 5). In designing the new
system, models were used to draw the lines, but aerial photo-
graphs were used within the model uncertainty to decide which
houses should be in each zone. The demonstration of ﬂexibility,
albeit small, in the boundaries and in the civil actions was appre-
ciated by local people, who felt that their concerns about the pre-
vious system had been heard. While models themselves are
‘‘boundary-ordering devices’’, which evolve with time and may
provoke small shifts in the boundaries, the HLS itself is a boundary
object that has been shown to be very effective (Donovan et al.,
2012a). It is also the result of a long period of scientiﬁc endeavour
to reﬁne the models, and scientiﬁc and political will to ﬁnd a ﬂex-
ible system.Conclusions
The case study in this article shows the profound social and
political challenges that face science as it is applied in risk manage-
ment – and that face policymakers as they seek to order the natural
landscape and make it ‘safe’. It shows that scientiﬁc advancement
is both triggered by and feeds into the decision-making process.
Scientists on Montserrat were simultaneously focussed on explic-
itly scientiﬁc endeavour (e.g. modelling a pyroclastic ﬂow) and
on applying belief-based probabilistic methods as boundary-order-
ing devices to manage uncertainty. The framing of the reports sug-
gests that this was boundary work – seeking to uphold the validity
of these methods as scientiﬁc, whilst consciously applying them to
social questions and being aware of the uncertainty. Politicians, on
the other hand, used the models as boundary objects that could be
called upon to bring authority (from science) to their decisions. The
liminal nature of this work is evidence that the ‘‘boundary’’ itself is
incomplete, in nature and in time: dialogue between scientiﬁc
method and policy occurs via diffusion. Science leaks into the polit-
ical, and vice versa, through a boundary-layer that is characterised
by uncertainty and ﬂuidity. Models are used to bring some order to
the boundary, but are themselves ambiguous: they can be appliedto the negotiation of authority and uncertainty in different ways by
different groups.
The use of a suite of models with different physical bases on
Montserrat shows an awareness of their individual limitations as
representations of the natural system and provides a way of incor-
porating the resulting uncertainty into the assessment. However,
the models did not always have an ordering effect because they
were open to challenge from stakeholders, because of their social
and political impact on evacuation zones and because some of
the people recognised that the models had a human origin (‘‘you
get out of your computer what you put in!’’). This is similar to
the ‘‘institutional risk’’ described by Rothstein et al. (2006): in
the process of doing scientiﬁc risk assessment, institutions take a
risk that their assessments may not be well received. Where multi-
ple institutions are involved, that risk may not be evenly spread –
for example, the setting of boundaries was done by the NDPRAC on
the basis of modelling by the SAC, but both the SAC and the MVO
perceived some consequences. The ways in which the decisions
were justiﬁed to minimise institutional risk to the government
was perceived as laying the ‘‘blame’’ on the scientists, even though
the uncertainty was very high. Lines on maps are more obvious to a
lay reader than the uncertainties in the tables of a risk assessment:
there is an imbalance between the scientiﬁc perspective and the
social interpretation. In the case of Montserrat, this is complicated
by the multiplicity of groups, nations, laws, institutions and inter-
ests that are represented on and around a small island. The lines on
the maps were clearly viewed as occupying different spaces and
differently-certain spaces by different actors. Furthermore, the
murky line between science and policy was placed differently by
different actors. These positions were connected through ﬂows
of, among other things, responsibility, blame, ownership, uncer-
tainty and identity. Models provided a means of ordering the
potential claims made about the lines.
The representational power of models can thus increase their
authority but unintentionally hide the uncertainty inherent in
them. The uncertainty may be clear to those with ‘‘inside’’ knowl-
edge, but has to be framed externally to the models themselves
(such as in reports). Philosophers of science have distinguished
between ‘‘internal’’ and ‘‘external’’ modes of science (e.g. Shapin,
1992). Boundary-ordering – of which risk assessment is typically
an example – occurs on the threshold, neither fully inside the sci-
entiﬁc community nor outside it. The transdisciplinarity of risk
undermines a purely quantitative assessment: it is socially
contestable because it is socially constructed: while science may
resist accusations of social construction, risk and hazard cannot.
Qualitative uncertainty and ambiguity may stem from the nature
of the assessments themselves, their social context and the differ-
ing perceptions of uncertainty that they try to order (Stirling,
2007). Narratives provide a means of expressing the complex rela-
tionships between people, ideas and objects in the risk manage-
ment process – they can describe and elucidate connections.
Studies of the process of science in such contexts are critical, since
the dynamic nature of science through space and time (Massey,
1999) causes shifts in uncertainties, as occurred during 2007 on
Montserrat. The role of social uncertainties – such as those from
scientists’ own individual approaches and judgements – suggests
approaches that tend towards ‘‘scientiﬁc perspectivism’’ (Giere,
2004) rather than clinging to positivism or seeking to convince sci-
entists to accept pure social construction. However, these types of
approach depend upon a reﬂexive acceptance of the role of the
researcher (or modeller) in the generation of the models.
Uncertainties – both scientiﬁc and social – produce a boundary
layer in which diffusion is possible between scientiﬁc advice and
policymaking. While disaster risk reduction has tended to focus
on the social processes within populations that affect risk, there
is a rich ﬁeld in studying the social processes of science as it
164 A.R. Donovan, C. Oppenheimer / Geoforum 58 (2015) 153–165informs policy as well and in thinking about how these processes
might be accounted for. This article suggests that as well as pro-
moting the integration of local and scientiﬁc knowledges
(Gaillard, 2008; Gaillard and Mercer, 2013), it is necessary to
reconceptualise the science–policy interface and its impact on
and through scientiﬁc subjects in the management of disasters: it
is a diffusive, open space with multiple connectivities.
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